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Non-technical summary 
Adaptation to climate change is becoming increasingly important in the political and scientific de-
bate. The reason for this is that climate change impacts are visible already today and will intensify 
in the next decades. Furthermore, the prospects for an effective international agreement on climate 
policy with binding emission reduction targets are uncertain. The economic analysis of adaptation, 
however, is still in its infancy with a few economic studies covering specific aspects of adaptation. 
Therefore, this paper aims at developing a broad economic framework for adaptation which can 
provide a foundation and a starting point for future economic research. The economic analysis al-
lows us to distinguish between autonomous adaptation by private agents on the one hand and col-
lective adaptation measures by government entities on the other. Our theoretical economic ap-
proach follows the basic economic paradigm of efficient competitive markets where government 
intervention is justified by market failure only. The most important case of market failure in adapta-
tion is the provision of public goods, such as dykes or weather information systems. Moreover, we 
discuss further political objectives, namely equity and security of supply, in the context of adapta-
tion to climate change. The approach developed in the theory part is then applied to the case of Ger-
many. Due to its size and geography as well as its relatively diversified sectoral structure Germany 
is a good example to analyze and develop adaptation measures in climate sensitive sectors in indus-
trialized countries, particularly in Europe. The case study on Germany which is based on the avail-
able literature covers sectors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, namely agriculture, 
energy, water and coastal protection, and human health. While from an economic perspective adap-
tation in agriculture and energy should predominantly be autonomous, the government has a role in 
the sectors water, coastal protection and health. The results indicate that in Germany beside the 
negative impacts of climate change positive impacts are to be expected in some sectors, such as 
agriculture. Therefore a differentiated adaptation strategy by consumers, producers, and policy 
makers requires more research into the climate impacts on different sectors of life and the econ-
omy.  
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Das Thema Anpassung an den Klimawandel gewinnt eine immer größere Bedeutung in der politi-
schen und wissenschaftlichen Debatte. Eine Ursache hierfür liegt in dem bereits heute spürbaren 
Klimawandel, der sich in den nächsten Jahrzehnten weiter beschleunigen wird. Zugleich müssen 
die Erfolgsaussichten eines effektiven globalen Klimaschutzabkommens als unsicher eingeschätzt 
werden. Die ökonomische Analyse der durch den Klimawandel bedingten Verhaltensänderungen 
steht jedoch erst am Anfang – die wenigen verfügbaren Studien beschränken sich oftmals auf spezi-
fische Anpassungsaspekte. Vor diesem Hintergrund verfolgt die vorliegende Arbeit das Ziel, einen 
allgemeinen ökonomischen Ansatz für eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse der Anpassung an den 
Klimawandel zu entwickeln. Dieser ökonomische Ansatz erlaubt eine Unterscheidung zwischen 
autonomer Anpassung privater Akteure einerseits und kollektiver Anpassung staatlicher Institutio-
nen andererseits. Die Arbeit folgt dem ökonomischen Grundparadigma effizienter Wettbewerbs-
märkte, in dem Eingriffe des Staates zunächst nur bei Marktversagen zu rechtfertigen sind. Bei An-
passungsmaßnahmen ist die wichtigste Form von Marktversagen die Bereitstellung öffentlicher 
Güter, wie z.B. der Deichbau oder meteorologische Informationssysteme. Außerdem werden weite-
re Motive politischen Handelns, Verteilungsgerechtigkeit und Versorgungssicherheit, im Zusam-
menhang mit Anpassungsmaßnahmen diskutiert. Aufbauend auf der allgemeinen ökonomischen 
Analyse der Anpassungsmaßnahmen an den Klimawandel wendet die Arbeit die gewonnenen Er-
kenntnisse auf den Fall Deutschlands an. Aufgrund seiner Größe, seiner geografischen Lage und 
seiner sektoralen Struktur stellt Deutschland ein geeignetes Fallbeispiel dar, um Effekte des Kli-
mawandels und die Entwicklung geeigneter Anpassungsstrategien in Industriestaaten, vor allem in 
der Europäischen Union, zu untersuchen. Die Ausführungen basieren auf der verfügbaren Literatur 
und umfassen die folgenden, vom Klimawandel besonders betroffenen Sektoren: Landwirtschaft, 
Energie, Wasser und Küstenschutz sowie Gesundheit. Während aus ökonomischer Sicht bei Land-
wirtschaft und Energie Anpassung vor allem von privaten Akteuren geleistet werden sollte, gibt es 
in den Sektoren Wasser, Küstenschutz und Gesundheit eine Reihe von Staatsaufgaben. Die Ergeb-
nisse zeigen zudem, dass in Deutschland neben den negativen Wohlfahrtseffekten des Klimawan-
dels in einzelnen Bereichen, wie z.B. in der Landwirtschaft, auch positive Auswirkungen zu erwar-
ten sind. Eine differenzierte Anpassungsstrategie von Konsumenten, Unternehmen und staatlichen 
Entscheidungsträgern erfordert deshalb eine vertiefte Erforschung der Klimaveränderungen und –
auswirkungen in einzelnen Sektoren und Lebensbereichen. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is a challenge to societies and economies around the globe. Basically, policy mak-
ers have two options: they can try to slow down and possibly halt climate change (mitigation), or 
they can accept the change and let their economies at least partially adapt to it (adaptation). Both 
strategies involve costs: On the one hand, carbon abatement requires the usage of new and compa-
rably expensive technologies, e.g. renewable energy sources. On the other hand, adjustments to the 
effects of a changing climate require private and public resources, e.g. the use of air conditioning 
and the construction of flood protection systems. Both strategies are not mutually exclusive: An 
optimal global policy should counterbalance mitigation and adaptation, minimizing the sum of 
costs caused by mitigation, adaptation, and residual damages. Nordhaus (1991) derives two condi-
tions for such a cost minimum: First, the marginal costs of emissions reduction should be equal to 
the marginal benefits of emission reduction, i.e. the avoided marginal residual costs of climate 
change. Second, adaptation should be realized up to the point where the marginal benefits of adap-
tation are equal to the marginal costs of adaptation. There is a trade-off between both policy options 
at the global level: More emissions reduction makes less adaptation necessary and vice versa.1 Of 
course this stylized global perspective has its theoretical pitfalls and practical limits. Accounting for 
costs of both mitigation and adaptation of climate change is an enormous scientific endeavor, in-
volving branches of agricultural scientist, geologist, meteorologists, and economists. Uncertainties 
about future developments require a choice of risk evaluation.2 Aggregating costs is not innocuous 
– it means that distributional issues are neglected. Also, the viewpoint may not be appropriate for 
real world politics: As there is no benevolent king enforcing a global cost-benefit analysis, any 
mitigation effort will depend on the outcome of international negotiations between sovereign na-
tions which are likely to pursue their particular interests in the implementation of climate policy. 
Finally, in the real world, as emphasized by Tol (2005), adaptation and mitigation are done by dif-
ferent people operating at different spatial and temporal scales. This hampers the theoretically pos-
sible trade-off between adaptation and mitigation. Therefore, at the national level, adaptation policy 
                                                 
1 Already Schelling (1992) is talking about a second trade-off between mitigation and adaptation. Higher mitigation 
efforts may lead to a lower growth rate and therefore to a lower adaptive capacity of an economy. Tol (2007) is refer-
ring to this effect as the “double trade-off between adaptation and mitigation”. This effect is, however, not discussed 
here. 
2 Recent studies suggest that uncertainty about low-probability-high-impact events may limit the applicability of a cost-
benefit analysis (Tol 2003, Weitzman 2007, 2009). 
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can be treated as a field of action independent from mitigation policy that is determined on an in-
ternational level. 
Despite of its likely relevance adaptation has so far been considerably less prominent in the public, 
scientific and economic debate about climate change than mitigation. In Germany, for example, as 
early as 1992 the parliamentary committee of enquiry “Protection of the earth atmosphere” was 
established (Deutscher Bundestag 1992). The focus of this commission was almost entirely on 
mitigation and impacts. The National Adaptation Strategy (BMU 2008), however, was published 
only in 2008. This emphasis on mitigation is representative for European countries, as Tol (2005, 
p. 572) phrases bluntly: “For a long time, it was politically incorrect to speak about adaptation to 
climate change, because it presumably implies accepting defeat in the battle against evil emissions 
[…] This has changed […]”. 
There are at least two main reasons for the shift in perception. First, climate change is already ob-
servable and – given the inertia of the climate system – will inevitably intensify (IPCC 2007a and 
EEA 2008). In other words, even if the world will not warm more than 2°C above pre-industrial 
temperatures, a target proposed by the EU (CEU 2004), adaptation is necessary. Second, due to the 
well-known free rider incentives in international negotiations on climate policy, the prospect for a 
binding agreement restricting world’s emissions sufficiently to halt climate change are at least un-
certain (Helm 2008). Consequently, adaptation is increasingly gaining weight on the political and 
scientific agenda. 
This paper aims at developing a normative economic framework for adaptation – a framework 
which allows to distinguish between decentralized adaptation by private agents on the one hand and 
centralized adaptation measures by governmental entities on the other. The ubiquitous scarcity of 
resources makes an economic approach necessary in order to determine an optimal degree of adap-
tation. The perspective we take is the one of a sovereign state – not an international arena, where 
regulation is difficult to enforce. The efficiency-oriented approach is based on the paradigm of 
market failure and is complemented by two further grounds of government intervention, equity 
concerns and security of supply. Moreover, we identify open research questions in the nascent field 
of adaptation to climate change requiring careful empirical investigation.  
The framework developed in the theory part is applied to the case of Germany. Due to its size and 
geography, private and public decision makers in Germany have to cope with various effects of 
climate change, positive as well as negative depending on the region and sector. Both private and 
public actors have to develop adequate strategies how to gain from potential benefits and how to 
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limit adverse effects. Given its relatively diversified sectoral structure, the case of Germany can 
serve as an example for the development and implementation of adaptation measures in climate 
sensitive sectors in industrialized countries, in particular in Europe.  
Climate change has different faces in Germany. Starting from the North, the two coastlines at North 
Sea and Baltic Sea are endangered by a rising sea level (Sterr 2008) and possibly by an increased 
risk of storm surges (Storch et al. 2007). In winter, regional climate projection models also calcu-
late a considerable rise of mean precipitation by up to 30 % of current precipitation (UBA 2008). In 
contrast, Eastern Germany may experience severe water shortages in summer, since summer pre-
cipitation is expected to decrease and parts of Eastern Germany already today have a negative water 
balance (UBA 2005). Along with a general trend to higher temperatures throughout Germany, heat-
waves are expected to occur more often and the number of cold days will decrease. Adverse health 
affects due to temperature stress or an increased risk of vector-borne and food-borne diseases are 
likely to ensue. The risk of heat waves holds especially for urban areas in the South-West, where 
temperatures are relatively high today already and are predicted to rise by 2°C - 4°C, depending the 
climate projection model and IPCC emission scenario. Further in the South, Germany borders on 
the Alps and is affected from a retreat of glaciers and considerable decrease of snow coverage and 
snow reliability, with adverse effects on ecosystems as well as winter sports tourism. Another very 
important impact of climate change is the increasing probability of extreme weather events. Such 
extreme events encompass drought periods, heavy rainfalls with floods, hail, and storms. These 
extreme weather events are expected to occur more often in all parts of Germany given the current, 
inevitable climate change. Exact predictions of extreme weather events and their regional frequency 
are difficult to make with occurrence strongly depending on local and temporal conditions (UBA 
2008, Schönwiese et al. 2005).  
This paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 we develop the theoretical framework for an economic 
analysis of adaptation. We use the economic paradigm of market failure, and discuss equity aspects 
and security of supply as two additional motives for policy making. Applying the economic argu-
ments to practical issues, section 3 shows which climate change impacts are to be expected for 
Germany, highlights the main vulnerabilities and proposes appropriate adaptation strategies. We 
focus on agriculture, energy, water and coastal protection, and public health. Section 4 concludes 
and gives an outlook on future research. 
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2. Theoretical framework for adaptation 
In this section we focus on the theoretical framework for adaptation by private and public actors. 
As for a definition, we follow the IPCC (2007) that defines adaptation as the “[a]djustment in natu-
ral or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which mod-
erates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.” Taking a nationally-oriented perspective we ana-
lyze which institutions are necessary to realize the optimal level of adaptation. Thereby the border-
line between adaptation by private agents and adaptation by the government is set by the concept of 
market failures. Furthermore, we discuss how uncertainty may affect the design of optimal adapta-
tion policy and how adaptation impacts insurance markets. Finally, we discuss equity and security 
of supply issues that arise in the context of adaptation. 
2.1 Efficient Private and Public Adaptation 
Normative economic theory rationalizes public policy intervention into private markets by market 
failure – in theses cases the government can enhance economic efficiency by specific regulation. 
Another rationale for public policy is distributive justice: While there is no consensus about the 
value of equity in economics (nor society), economists study efficient redistribution for a given 
equity target and spots equity-efficiency trade-offs (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) This rationale also 
applies to the challenge of adaptation to climate change as described in this section. In particular, 
governmental adaptation measures can be economically justified if they take the form of public 
goods or social insurance. Furthermore, climate change as well as adaptation policy can affect re-
distribution, thus leading to the need for adjustment of social policy. 
At first we consider adaptation measures under certainty. The provision of public goods is a typical 
case of a market failure (Bator 1958): as their consumption value is not limited to a single con-
sumer, free-riding leads to under-provision by private investors, in particular in the case of perfect 
public goods that are non-excludable and non-rival. In our framework, a dyke sheltering an ag-
glomeration from flooding is the central example: No individual in the agglomeration can be ex-
cluded from the increase in security provided by the dyke. This makes a tax-financed public in-
vestment in the dyke socially efficient. If, in contrast, all benefits from reducing the damage of cli-
mate change (or from increasing benefits from it) accrue to an individual only, e.g. by air-
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conditioning of his home, private provision is efficient3 and public intervention is not warranted. 
The argument holds not only for consumption of private households, but also for intermediary 
goods in production. Following the literature, we label this form of adaptation autonomous, while 
adaptation undertaken by groups or public institutions will be called collective.4  
The efficiency of autonomous adaptation hinges on the assumptions of full information on climate 
change and competitive markets. Take the following example: Under changing precipitation pat-
terns an electricity company will efficiently plan and invest into a hydro power plant, but basic hy-
drological research into the development of water flows should be conducted at public research 
institutes. The reason is that information has public good properties. Apart from producing and dis-
tributing information that help economic agents to better understand the nature and impacts of ex-
pected climate change, the public goods provided as part of adaptation are infrastructure goods: 
either specific infrastructure of protection, such as dykes, or existing infrastructure, such as roads, 
railway systems or energy networks5, that have to be adapted to endure climatic changes.  
An important question for economic research concerns the optimal degree of provision of public 
goods under climate change. Theory provides us with Samuelson’s rule (1954): the sum of all mar-
ginal benefits from public adaptation should equal the marginal costs of public investment. Two 
points are important to note: First, the provision of a public good can become too costly – in some 
cases, e.g., it may be socially preferable to give up an agglomeration if the construction of flood 
protection exceeds reasonable cost limits. Second, in spite of the general notion of non-rival con-
sumption of public goods (“everybody can enjoy a landscape”), in the real world public goods of-
ten have a local or regional character: A dyke usually protects a certain city, not a whole country – 
the local, not the national population is the beneficiary. In so far the construction of a dyke can al-
ternatively be characterized as an example of collective adaptation: a group engaging in collective 
action where the marginal costs of the measure exceed the benefits for each individual, but the sum 
of marginal benefits is greater than marginal costs. According to the theory of fiscal federalism 
(Oates 1999), it is efficient to assign the task of providing the local public good to the local authori-
ties and tax-payers: The construction of a dyke providing shelter to one city only accrues to mu-
nicipal authorities and local taxpayers. This view on local public goods can be altered by negative 
                                                 
3 Formally, individuals will equate marginal costs of the measure to marginal benefits, leading to a socially optimal 
solution. 
4 Mendelsohn (2000) uses the terms private and joint adaptation. 
5 The latter are usually imperfect public goods, as they are excludable: e.g. consumers can be disconnected from an 
electricity grid. 
 
6 
 
externalities. Economists refer to the term externality or external costs if an economic transaction 
negatively or positively affects a party outside the transaction (not accounting for relative price 
changes). The prime example is pollution from a production process that affects the public and 
therefore requires governmental regulation. In the case of local public goods, if their provision in 
one locality (i.e. collective adaptation of one group) has a negative impact on other localities (i.e. 
adaptation measures by other groups), uncoordinated actions by the localities (or groups) will be 
socially inefficient.6 In that case planning by a central government can ensure the socially efficient 
outcome. In reality conflicts of interest between political leaders of central and local authorities can 
well lead to inefficiencies. Moreover, adaptation measures sometimes may not be so easily disen-
tangled – so any detailed study of a centrally planned adaptation measure has to take a possible 
crowding out of autonomous adaptation into account.  
One important public good in the discussion of climate change is information. The efficiency of 
markets hinges on the assumption of full information among economic actors – asymmetries of 
information distort market outcomes.7 In the case of adaptation, this refers primarily to information 
about climate change – sellers and buyers of property, e.g., should have the same information about 
the regional exposure to climate change risk. Further examples of information asymmetries occur in 
the insurance market – they are discussed below.  
A final important role of a central government is the establishment of an institutional framework of 
property rights. Without a functioning property rights system long-term investments which are cru-
cial for several adaptation strategies will not take place, endangering both public and autonomous 
adaptation. An example would be the property rights to a water source that are the prerequisite for 
the construction of an agricultural irrigation system.  
2.2 Adaptation strategies under uncertainty and irreversibility 
So far we have neglected the aspect of uncertainty in climate change. Clearly, uncertainty matters 
for climate change: scientific uncertainty concerning the expected regional effects, impact uncer-
                                                 
6 For instance, building dykes by a local authority in order to prevent river floods up-stream may increase the risk of 
floods downstream. In a non-cooperative environment, an up-stream decision maker will not take into account the 
negative externality for the down-stream region generated by the dyke. 
7 In the case of incomplete information, the efficiency of markets is not guaranteed. This does not imply, though, that 
government intervention is always a possible or sensible solution. Often, elicitation of information is costly. In this 
case, the efficiency of a market transaction has to be traded-off against the cost of providing information. 
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tainty concerning the economic impacts, and policy uncertainty (Heal and Kriström 2002). In this 
section we will describe the framework to analyze optimal strategies of adaptation under uncer-
tainty.8 The next section will discuss another aspect of uncertainty – adaptation of insurance mar-
kets to changing climate conditions and a higher likelihood of extreme weather events. 
Uncertainty and the option to wait for better information may have an effect on the optimal adapta-
tion behavior, in particular if decisions are irreversible. This is the topic of real option theory (Dixit 
and Pindyk 1994), which studies optimal behavior under irreversibility, uncertainty and learning. 
Uncertainty about the exact nature of climate change impacts at the local and regional level makes 
it difficult to fine-tune adaptation measures. However, private actors and the government are likely 
to learn more about local impacts as time proceeds. Adaptation benefits (avoided climate damages) 
occur in the future – so they should be interpreted as expected benefits. In contrast costs for long-
term adaptation projects, such as investment in climate-proof infrastructure (e.g. for transportation 
or energy networks) are certain and typically irreversible (i.e. after the investment costs are sunk). 
At the same time, the timing of the investment is for the investor to choose – it can be delayed if 
appropriate, e.g. instead of building a dyke now the policy maker can wait for better information 
regarding the likelihood of a flooding in his agglomeration. Real option theory studies the effect of 
flexibility on optimal action. In the case of adaptation measures – both by private or public actors – 
given uncertainty with respect to the expected regional effects of climate change, the benefits of the 
investment in an adaptation project have to exceed the costs by a positive amount (so-called hurdle 
rate), in order to justify the investment. This amount is the “option value” not to invest but to wait 
and to delay the project. In other words, the classic rule according to which the present value has to 
cover at least the costs of investments does not hold under these circumstances. The optimal solu-
tion of this problem includes the comparison of investment costs and present values at all possible 
time slots, i.e. it has to be taken into account that the investment is possible at different time slots. 
Using the option to wait, an investor can possibly gain new information about future benefits (but 
also about better adaptation techniques which may reduce costs) and can adapt his behavior to 
changed conditions. Real option effects can work into the opposite direction, too: Cheap options for 
                                                 
8 We refer to Arrovian uncertainty only – i.e. uncertain events where the probability distribution is known. There has 
been little to no study so far how to assess Knightian uncertainty in the context of climate change, i.e. uncertainty over 
events with unknown probability distribution. 
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adaptation or mitigation may disappear or become more costly as climate change intensifies over 
time. An appropriate analysis of an adaptation strategy has to incorporate this aspect too.9 
2.3 Adaptation and insurance 
This section analyses the theoretical framework of insurance markets and their relevance for adap-
tation. Climate change tends to increase the frequency and severity of extreme weather events 
(IPCC 2007a). Worldwide damages from extreme weather events have clearly increased in the last 
decades. Schmidt et al. (2009) calculate that even if controlling for effects such as population 
changes, inflation, increased wealth or changes in settlement behavior, there is a significant positive 
correlation between natural disasters and global temperature.  
The insurance sector can play an important role in addressing the uncertainty with respect to local 
effects of climate change. Principally, insurance markets are able to provide protection against cli-
mate-induced losses. The transfer of risk from risk-averse subjects to risk-neutral insurance compa-
nies leads to welfare improvements and an efficient level of precaution. Given an appropriate insti-
tutional framework – in particular a property rights system and functioning credit markets – insur-
ance markets will find an efficient reaction to climate change. The effectiveness of insurance mar-
kets for climate adaptation may be hampered, though, by informational problems (adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems), requiring some form of government intervention.  
Let us briefly recall the basic paradigms of insurance markets, as studied by the theory of expected 
utility (Schoemaker 1982, Gollier 2000). The theory of insurance generally assumes many risk-
averse customers facing independent risks who pay premiums to a risk-neutral insurer in exchange 
for protection against possible future losses. Using the law of large numbers and knowledge about 
the distribution of risk an insurance company in principle takes a risk-neutral position – the total 
expected value of damages is equal to the total value of expected revenues. When customers have 
no real influence over risks insurance policies are relatively simple and parties frequently purchase 
complete coverage which is the socially optimal outcome. More often, however, customers can 
influence risks – think of settlement behavior that can influence the risk of a flood damages. This 
type of problem in insurance markets, which arises from the impossibility to control the behavior of 
the insured, is labeled moral hazard problem (Arrow 1963). Most often, the socially optimal out-
                                                 
9 See Fankhauser (2006) for a discussion of incentives for early investments in adaptation projects when climate change 
damages in the near future can be avoided. 
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come – perfect insurance and sufficient precaution – cannot be achieved under these circumstances, 
but only a second best insurance contract with varying premia and partial coverage, trading off the 
insurance motive and the reduction of moral hazard. The second type of problem is commonly 
known as adverse selection (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976): As an insurance company cannot dis-
tinguish between high-risk and low-risk customers – the risk is private information – it has to offer 
one insurance contract to all, pooling all risks. The implicit redistribution of such a scheme from 
low to high-risk type may lead to the breakdown of the insurance market when low-risk types find 
the premium too high and withdraw. Generally speaking we can say that distortions of insurance 
markets occur if insurance takers or insurance companies have incomplete information or misper-
ceive risks, i.e. information is distributed asymmetrically. Sometimes insurance is not offered be-
cause risks are hard for insurance companies to estimate. In particular this is the case if the prob-
ability of a catastrophic event is very low so that the law of large numbers can no longer be applied. 
These difficulties are highly relevant for adaptation to climate change because the probability of 
extreme weather events is not only uncertain but also changes with global warming (Müller-
Fürstenberger and Schumacher 2008). Another problem arises if the risks faced by different insur-
ance takers are non-independent which is likely to be the case with climate change damages. Insur-
ance companies then cannot be confident of meeting their costs and they will therefore tend to 
charge higher premiums, presuming some degree of risk aversion on their part. In this case, the 
insurance takers expected utility will be maximized if they obtain less than full coverage of dam-
ages (Shavell 1987). This effect could be alleviated if (international) re-insurers pooled the risks 
facing different (national) insurers.  
Insuring damages from climate change also raises moral hazard problems.10 Take the case of insur-
ance against building damages from a storm: It may very well lead to less careful construction work 
and insufficient protection. Similarly, someone may be encouraged by the prospect of government 
support to buy a house near the coast taking an unnecessary risk of flood damage. The examples 
show, however, that the degree of moral hazard will depend on the willingness or ability of the in-
surance company to gather information. In principle it is free too control the construction or the site 
of a building and incorporate the information in the insurance contract. However, at least in some 
                                                 
10 As has been discussed by Wildasin (2007) and Goodspeed et al. (2007) in the context of recent US hurricane events, 
the amount of autonomous adaptation to some climate change-related events may be lower if there is a perception that 
ex-post, the government will reimburse economic agents for much of the damages arising from such events. Even with 
the recognition that there may no full compensation, the ex-ante precaution might not reach the efficient level.  
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cases the individual risk evaluation may prove to be too costly and the company will offer standard 
contracts with partial coverage only. The incident of moral hazard can also arise from public inter-
vention: Many natural hazards have shown that politicians as well as the private sector provide fi-
nancial aids for victims. The effort to help the victims of natural disasters is an act of emergency 
and humanity. As in the case of private insurance anticipation of loss compensation by the govern-
ment may lead to insufficient precaution and – as mentioned above – to crowding out of private 
insurance. Therefore, ex-post emergency relief should be limited to most elementary protection.  
The underlying assumption of the argument is that potential victims have complete information 
about expected damages and appropriate preventive measures. Most often this will not be the case 
with natural hazards. People are rather likely to underestimate and highly discount the full extent of 
the risk of rare events (Kunreuther 1996, Schwarze and Wagner 2006). The acquisition and distri-
bution of information about risks could be spotted as task of governmental action, leading to an 
increase of the demand for insurance coverage. The moral hazard problem arising from anticipation 
of ex-post emergency relief may still lead to under-insurance. Mandatory insurance schemes are a 
possible solution to this dilemma. As opposed to emergency relief a mandatory insurance scheme 
would allow the insurance takers to calculate the amount of compensation expected and addition-
ally would guarantee comprehensive demand for and supply of insurance coverage. The instrument 
of mandatory insurance is well known from other economic fields, such as public health (Breyer 
and Zweifel 2009, Colombo 2001). However, also in designing the insurance mandate the govern-
ment has to trade-off likely insurance benefits and possible moral hazard costs which arise when-
ever private precaution against damages are influenced by the presence of insurance. 
Apart from mandating insurance or providing general information on climate change risks the role 
of the government in insurance markets is one of control and enforcement of contracts. In devel-
oped countries, for example, governments set building standards to prevent dangerous and faulty 
construction work. Such legislation can be in some conflict with the freedom of consumer choice, 
but basic standards in construction work are a prerequisite for contracts between a building com-
pany and its client, defining quality standards of construction work. Building standards are relevant 
for insurance markets, too: They create a level field for insurance by making more explicit likely 
risks associated with buildings. 
Finally, depending on the national circumstances there may be the responsibility of a government 
to act as insurer of last resort in case of extreme weather events and to ensure affordable adaptation 
for low-income households. The fiscal effects will depend on the design of the implemented natural 
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disaster insurance scheme and the role of the government in this scheme. Given the available in-
formation on damage estimates the necessary funds for the former may be considerable. These ef-
fects will presumably increase over time (i) because temperature and therefore the frequency and 
severity of natural disasters will increase and (ii) because of increasing wealth, population changes, 
and changes in settlement behavior. If the insurance density is low the state has to been prepared to 
compensate victims for losses caused by natural forces. The financial aid may withdraw important 
public investments. In contrast, if the insurance scheme is designed in a way that the density is 
high, many natural hazards can be compensated without government intervention. In this case pub-
lic emergency relief would be necessary only if damage costs exceed the capacity of insurers and 
re-insures. That is state participation is strictly limited to cover the mega-damages. It is important 
to note that not only the need of state intervention but also damage costs can be expected to be 
lower in case of high insurance density because appropriately designed insurance policies induce 
potential victims to take preventive measures.  
2.4 Equity aspects 
Another possible justification for government intervention in the field of adaptation is equity. With 
respect to adaptation, equity issues may arise within countries, between EU member states, and 
between industrialized countries and developing countries. As explained in the preceding subsec-
tions, private (respectively regional) adaptation may be efficient in many areas, but it need not be 
considered as just (Mendelsohn 2000). This argument seems especially powerful in the interna-
tional context of climate change: While developed countries bear the main responsibility for the 
strong increase in CO2 emissions during the last century, climate change damages are expected to 
be higher for developing countries where the adaptive capacity is relatively low (Parry et al. 2005, 
Goklany 2007).11 
However, this is essentially a topic of development economics. In our contribution we focus on 
adaptation in the national context. Here, both vertical and horizontal equity (Atkinson and Stiglitz 
1980) matter for public policy, i.e. aspects of redistribution between high and low income house-
                                                 
11 While G8 countries are responsible for approximately half of the world’s cumulated CO2 emissions between 1850 
and 2000 (WRI 2009), G5 countries, i.e. China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico, represent only a fraction of 
9.6 %. In terms of individual countries, the largest emitters are the USA (23.6 % of the world’s cumulated emissions), 
the EU-25 (21.6 %), Russia (6.6 %) and Germany (6.0 %). China which recently became the world’s largest CO2 emit-
ter (MNP, 2008) is only responsible for a fraction of 5.7 % of the world’s cumulated CO2 emissions. 
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holds and the equal treatment of individuals by the law. With respect to vertical equity low-income 
households may not be able to afford adaptation measures and equity concerns may thus motivate 
the need for governmental action. The intense debate about the introduction of lower energy prices 
for fuel- or energy-poor households12 in order to protect these households against adverse effects is 
an example for this kind of distributional problem. In the future, there may be a similar discussion 
about the “right” prices for adaptation measures or prices for inputs for such measures. Essentially, 
society has to decide which human needs it considers to be elementary and deserve insurance by 
public authorities if a citizen cannot provide for himself. Adaptation may require new answers to 
this old question of social policy. Economic policy has to find measures to ensure these entitle-
ments without excessive efficiency losses. In principle, the preferable solution from an economist’s 
viewpoint is to give lump-sum transfers to low-income households. Thereby relative prices will not 
be distorted and the governmental support is transparent. The case of health insurance shows, 
though, that in some cases satisfying entitlements may require more complex answers, in particular 
when moral hazard and adverse selection render first-best solutions impossible. These can arise in 
the case of energy poverty, too: Poor households tend to live in rented rather than self-owned 
homes and will thus have little influence on the insulation. Real estate companies, on their part, will 
rather not invest into insulation when they cannot charge higher rents. This may justify government 
handling of social housing. 
The matter of horizontal equity may well prove to be trickier. As discussed in the section on public 
goods, it may well be efficient to shelter one agglomeration from flooding while giving up another 
agglomeration, depending on the relative costs and benefits. Clearly, however, such a policy deci-
sion has very different impacts on real estate property rights. If taken by a central government, the 
unequal treatment would surely provoke lawsuits. In the future governments will have to develop 
rules (and limits) for compensation for households whose property is not protected. Federal states 
will have to device a framework of local, regional and national responsibilities for adaptation. 
Given the huge fiscal consequence of both collective adaptation and compensation, this is a great 
challenge. 
                                                 
12 See for example “Barroso urges lower energy prices to help poor”, July 6th 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
eu. 
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2.5 Security of Supply 
Security of supply is one of the stated goals of energy policy in EU and US law (e.g. COM 2009a, 
HR 2007). While mostly discussed in relation to energy, arguments of security of supply are also – 
directly or indirectly – used in debates on food and water supply. All these sectors face consider-
able challenges by climate change, and thus security of supply matters for the debate of adaptation, 
too. From a theoretical economic perspective, the issue is odd at first sight: energy carriers, food 
and water are private goods in the economic sense of the word, and efficiency of markets in their 
provision should be guaranteed by the basic welfare theorems of economics. In the case of energy 
and water, transport provides an economic argument for government intervention: Electricity grids, 
gas pipelines and water sewage systems are typical examples of natural monopolies: Their provi-
sion of the transport service is characterized by increasing returns to scale, i.e. the larger the net-
work, the lower per-unit costs of transport (this is also called a network externality). Therefore 
competition between several providers of transport service is inefficient because one single network 
can provide the service at lower cost. This gives an economic rationale for network regulation, 
since a monopolistic provider is likely to overcharge his service. However, the argument for gov-
ernment intervention on grounds of security of supply goes beyond regulation of networks. Rather 
it is based on the presumption that the good in question is indispensable for economic production 
and individual welfare: Indeed a prolonged shortage of drinking water in a certain region would 
have devastating effects on public health.13 Similarly, albeit to a lesser extent, public welfare and 
economic production are vulnerable to blackouts of the electricity system. The policy issue arises 
because companies providing water or energy in a free market are not likely to insure their con-
sumers sufficiently against interruption of the supply: Given the short-term inelastic demand for the 
goods, markets are likely to clear at very high prices in case of a shortage – an efficient outcome, 
but unacceptable from a viewpoint of public welfare at least for some basic human needs. Private 
supply of drinking water is likely to be profitable during a drought period, but – given the elemen-
tary needs of the population – the government’s objective would be to ensure that there are suffi-
cient provisions for such a situation.14 The same reasoning applies to the energy sector, where secu-
                                                 
13 Northern China is an example – contamination of surface water and desertification endangers the drinking water 
supply and consequently the health of the population, in particular, rural areas (World Bank 2007). This is widely per-
ceived as a public policy issue, both in China and outside. 
14 While water is certainly not a public good – its consumption is rival – economists refer to it as a common-pool re-
source, justifying regulation on grounds of negative external effects (McGuiness 1999, Hardin 1968). Given the basic 
need for drinking water, the regulation of water supply may in practice be governed by both efficiency and equity con-
cerns. 
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rity of supply is viewed as an important pillar of energy policy (Helm 2002, Abbott 2001). This 
does not imply, though, that the provision of the good has to be organized by public authorities: In 
the case of liberalized electricity markets, in many countries the grid is operated by a private mo-
nopolist that is regulated by a public agency. In particular, the grid company is obliged by law to 
ensure the security of the network, i.e. the security of electricity supply. The costs are incorporated 
into the usage fees. In other words: Specific regulation can be used to enforce security of supply in 
otherwise free markets, carefully trading off security against efficiency. Apart from problems to be 
discussed in a national context, security of supply can be a geopolitical issue: the supply of gas 
from gas-exporting countries with a monopolistic position may lead to political pressure on the 
importing countries. Similarly, in some world regions access to drinking water is seen as a right 
enforceable by political and – if necessary – military means. However, this problem is beyond an 
economic welfare analysis, because any market rule or property right in this context is vulnerable to 
political manipulation. Economists may contribute to a positive analysis of these aspects of adapta-
tion to climate change by the study of international negotiations. These may e.g. arise in the context 
of access to scarce water resources or agricultural land with disputed property rights.  
As in the case of equity issues, adaptation to climate change sheds a new light on old questions of 
security of supply: Which goods and services are elementary, so that government intervention 
should guarantee their security of supply? What are the costs of such a policy? What is an accept-
able level of security of supply, e.g. in the case of drinking water? Public policy on adaptation will 
have to find answers to these questions. 
3. Climate change and economic policy in Germany 
In the sequel we apply the theoretical framework developed in section 2 to the case of adaptation in 
Germany. We focus on four climate-sensitive sectors and relevant fields of action, namely agricul-
ture, energy, water and coastal protection, and public health. First, we describe the impacts of cli-
mate change in the absence of adaptation, in order to clarify specific adaptation needs. Second, we 
analyze optimal adaptation responses using the theoretical framework of section 2.  
3.1 Impacts on agriculture 
Agriculture accounts for a relatively small share of German GDP (0.7 % in 2006, Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2009). Nevertheless, an analysis of the agriculture sector makes sense since it is one of 
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the most exposed to climate change. At the same time, the impacts of climate change on agriculture 
in Germany are in part detrimental and in part beneficial. 
As for the benefits, in terms of yields positive effects are to be expected, due to the rising mean 
temperature and the resulting elongation of the vegetation period. Each sort of plants and trees has a 
temperature, where the growth capacity under otherwise optimal conditions is the highest. For ex-
ample, the optimal temperature for corn lies between 25°C and 30°C, for potatoes between 15°C 
and 20°C respectively (Chmielewski 2007). That is, where current mean temperatures are under the 
optimal temperature of certain plants, there are potentials of a higher yield due to a rising mean 
temperature. As for the elongation of the vegetation period, the number of days per year, when 
temperature allows for plant growth, is expected to rise significantly by up to 100 days in North 
Germany (2071/2100 compared to 1961/1990, Chmielewski 2007). That potentially gives the farm-
ers the opportunity of additional sowings. Moreover, a higher CO2 ratio in the atmosphere may be 
beneficial for plant growth. From the pre-industrial level of 280 ppm, the CO2 ratio has already 
reached the current level of 380 ppm; and by 2100 the IPCC estimates an increase of atmospheric 
CO2 up to 700 – 1000 ppm (IPCC 2007a), depending on mitigation efforts. Plants need CO2 for 
photosynthesis, and for most plants a CO2 ratio above 380 ppm would increase the growth poten-
tial, in particular for C3-plant types (e.g. wheat and sugar-beet) which are predominant in Germany. 
C4-plants like maize and sorghum do not profit so strongly from a higher CO2 ratio as they use CO2 
more efficiently and have almost reached their optimal CO2 usage today (Chmielewski 2007). 
However, the impact of this effect is controversial since it only holds under otherwise optimal con-
ditions, in particular nutrient and water supply.  
As for the cost of climate change, the potential benefits due to higher yields are partly and region-
ally offset by negative climate-induced impacts. Probably, the most severe negative effect will re-
sult from increasing climate variance and probability of extreme weather events. One single event 
of hail, heavy rainfall or a long drought period in summer can do more harm to yields than other-
wise favorable weather conditions can make good. Especially for Eastern Germany one can expect 
severe consequences of drought periods as already today the hydrological balance15 is negative in 
great parts of this region. Furthermore, day temperatures above the plant-specific optimum have 
considerable negative effects on plant growth rates during these days (Schlenker and Roberts 
2008). If it occurs, this negative effect of day temperatures above the optimum is stronger than 
                                                 
15 The hydrological balance means the difference of precipitation and potential surface evapotranspiration. 
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positive impact of moderately warming day temperatures below the optimum. Thus slight im-
provements in output potential by beneficial average environment conditions are accompanied by 
severe adverse effects from more frequent extreme weather events and reduced predictability. Other 
negative effects are the immigration and increased occurrence of vermin and diseases, like the blue-
tongue-disease or the European corn borer (Chmielewski 2007, Wittmann and Baylis 2000).  
Beside these supply side effects, there may be economically beneficial effects (for Germany) from 
developments at the demand side. As Parry et al. (2004) point out, global food production under 
various IPCC scenarios is likely to be negatively influenced by climate change (for 2080 projec-
tions of climate change impact on global food production vary between +1 % and -5 %). The im-
pact on global cereal prices has a positive sign in all scenarios and varies between +7 % and +20 % 
in 2080 under the assumption of a fully operative CO2 fertilization effect. Neglecting the relatively 
uncertain CO2 effect would result in even higher price increases (+50 % to +370 %). At the same 
time, producers in developed countries like Germany benefit from higher prices, as their relative 
productivity rises as well.16  
3.2 Adaptation in Agriculture 
From a historical perspective, the agriculture sector has a long experience with adaptation to chang-
ing environmental conditions. As long as it exists, farmers have experimented with their crops and 
cultivation methods to adapt optimally to their respective climate regimes. Autonomous adaptation 
measures to the current climate change are the change of cultivated plants to more thermophile and 
drought resistant sorts, research and development of new crops17, investments in irrigation systems, 
the increased use of plant protection, and the use of private insurance against extreme weather 
events.  
However, given the high level of regulation and state interference in the European agriculture sec-
tor one cannot discuss private adaptation measures leaving policy completely out of the picture. 
Following the argument in section 2.1 efficient state-planned adaptation includes setting a legal 
framework for water usage, chemical plant protection and research and development. State inter-
vention in these cases is necessary due to (positive and negative) externalities of autonomous adap-
                                                 
16 Comparable results are also to be found in other studies (Fischer et al. 1994, Rosenzweig et al. 1994, Julia et al. 
2007). 
17 Here also the genetic engineering may play a role such that crops are modified to be resistant to vermin, pests, dis-
eases or chemical plant protection (Rosenzweig et al. 2000).  
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tation measures. Furthermore, the government has a role as provider of public goods, as it promotes 
the production and distribution of information on region-specific climate change and thereby facili-
tates on the planning of climate-adapted planting and cultivation portfolios. Another essential task 
of the state is ensuring a functioning institutional framework for crop yield insurance, which in-
cludes regulation of financial markets and property rights. These activities can also be interpreted 
as a provision of public goods by the government. However, market failure alone has little explana-
tory power for the extensive agriculture policy which is presently pursued in Europe and which also 
influences adaptation processes. Security of food supply and equity aspects as presented in sec-
tions 2.4 and 2.5 are also important arguments for the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) of the 
EU and consequently for adaptation policy in the agriculture sector. Thus a purely economic per-
spective of public intervention in adaptation would not give a realistic picture of the current state of 
affairs in European agriculture. 
As an example for such government interventions we highlight public interference in the agricul-
tural insurance market observable in some EU countries. Publicly financed subsidies of crop yield 
insurance premiums play an important role in countries like Portugal, Spain, France and Austria 
(von Alten 2008, Prettenthaler et al. 2006). In contrast, to date the focus in Germany is more on ad-
hoc liquidity aid in the case of extreme weather events (Prettenthaler et al. 2006). These ad-hoc 
reliefs effectively have redistributional character, since they support the weak firms which would 
otherwise not survive after extreme weather events, like the long drought period in summer 2003. 
As discussed in section 2.3, there is an inherent moral hazard problem with this type of aid – it cre-
ates expectations, based on experiences of past events. The potential beneficiaries may be tempted 
to renounce costly protection or private insurance. However, they can not be completely sure 
whether and to which extent aids will be granted. Thus, a promotive framework of crop insurance 
in Germany would need more stipulated and credible regulations with regard to ad-hoc state relief 
to reduce uncertainty.18  
One possible solution may be a recent approach of the Bavarian state government for natural hazard 
insurances for private homes (Bayerische Staatsregierung 2009). The government of this federal 
state in South Germany currently runs an information campaign in order to sensitize private house-
holds to the risks of natural hazard damages on homes and contents. Effectively, this campaign is a 
                                                 
18 This line of reasoning is based on the argument for “rules rather than discretion” by Kydland and Prescott (1977), 
which is well-known to economists. The authors propose credible rules in order to avoid time-inconsistency of public 
policy. 
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publicly financed marketing campaign for private insurance. In this context the government empha-
sizes that state relief is only possible in exceptional cases where private insurance is not applicable 
(less than 2 % of Bavarian private households). Although this specific approach of the Bavarian 
state government targets only the market of insurance for private homes, a comparable strategy may 
also hold for government intervention in the market for crop yield insurances.  
To sum up, most adaptation measures in the German agricultural sector are of private nature, and 
they are not restricted to the prevention of damages or the reduction of climate change costs, but 
they also encompass the reaping of potential benefits that a warming temperature provides. From an 
economic viewpoint collective adaptation consists of the provision of information and setting the 
framework for autonomous adaptation. However, security of food supply may lead to additional 
government intervention. Moreover, agricultural policy is prone to pressure by particular interest 
groups – a problem which may arise in adaptation policy as well. For example, ad-hoc state inter-
vention in the case of extreme weather events, usually politically motivated, tends to have adverse 
effects on the efficient autonomous risk taking behavior. 
3.3 Impacts on the energy sector 
The energy supply sector accounts for 2.0 % of German GDP (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). The 
main impacts of climate change are related to the water reliance of many power plants. Water-
cooled heat power plants, such as nuclear and coal plants, are dependent on a steady supply of suf-
ficiently cool river water. Due to rising temperatures and less precipitation in summer, there are 
high risks of insufficient and over-heated river runoffs.19 The consequences of endured drought 
periods are a forced reduction of power supply, a challenge for the planning of a reliable energy 
system. Though these problems are not expected to occur regularly, a secure energy supply will 
become more expensive. Power plants that are independent of water-cooling techniques are less 
cost-efficient. The same reasoning applies to hydro-power: long dry periods may cause severe sup-
ply shortages due low water levels. Therefore hydropower is unlikely to offer a reliable back-up for 
water-cooled production (Kropp et al. 2009). 
                                                 
19 In a recent survey of ZEW 74 % of the interviewed energy experts expect a higher frequency of power plant shut-
downs due to global warming in the next 30 – 40 years (ZEW 2009). Power plants most at risk of forced shut-down are 
nuclear and coal power plants, which contribute significantly to the steady power load.  
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Water availability also affects energy supply by way of the dependency of water transport of coal 
power plants. Between 2004 and 2008, almost one half of the imported coal was transported to 
Germany via inland waterways, indicating the importance of waterways for the raw material supply 
of coal power plants (VDKI 2009, VDKI 2006). The supply of the energy carrier (mainly hard 
coal) via domestic waterways is endangered by high variations of the water level, as projected by 
future climate models. Floodings in winter after extreme rainfalls as well as too low levels in sum-
mer may challenge the input management of power plants and possibly lead to shortages in raw 
material supply.  
Apart from supply-side effects, climate change is likely to induce demand side effects in the energy 
sector: Patterns of consumer behavior are bound to change with demand for heating in winter de-
creasing and demand for cooling in summer may increasing. The net effect on total energy demand 
is not clear by now, but it will obviously pose new challenges to the seasonal optimal load man-
agement.  
3.4 Adaptation in the energy sector 
Until 2030 more than 50 % of the existing power plant capacity will be replaced by new plants 
(BMU and BMWi 2006). It can be expected that adaptation measures will be accounted for in the 
planning processes of new plants. As explained above this is in particular relevant for cooling sys-
tems and raw material supply. In the long run, power suppliers will have to develop strategies to 
cope with higher temperatures of cooling water, which may make increased research and develop-
ment efforts in new cooling technologies necessary. Public adaptation policy here becomes relevant 
with regard to the funding of basic research and development, which has strong public goods prop-
erties. Besides, concerning the discharge temperature of used cooling water, environmental regula-
tion is necessary to limit detrimental external effects on the river ecosystems. In that matter the bal-
ancing between environmental protection and a secure power supply becomes more important, as it 
was observable in the heat period of 2003, when exceptional governmental directives allowed dis-
charge temperatures above the thresholds to preserve the security of power supply in Germany 
(Hauff and Kluth 2006). With regard to domestic waterways it is important to remember that – as 
part of traffic infrastructure – they have the character of a public good and therefore public policy 
should contribute to a solution to likely transport problems arising in draught periods.  
Regarding the infrastructure of power distribution, it should be recalled that power failures cause 
considerable economic costs in industries and private households. Private providers of grid services 
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are likely to take economic losses of supply failure insufficiently into account, as they face no com-
petition and suffer only the temporary losses of grid fees. Regulators have to set the incentives right 
to ensure the investment into climate-proof infrastructure. In Germany, the Bundesnetzagentur has 
the duty to monitor network companies that have a legal obligation to ensure the safety of their 
grids, according to the argument developed in section 2.5.  
As explained above, at the demand side, there will be a shift from heating to cooling energy as a 
result of warmer temperatures. This has consequences for the structure of energy supply. There is 
empirical evidence concerning the implications for different energy carriers: De Cian et al. (2007) 
estimate temperature elasticities of demand for different countries. For most European countries 
(including Germany) the temperature elasticity of demand for electricity is positive while it is nega-
tive for gas and oil. Power producers will have to adapt to these altering usage patterns e.g. by in-
creasing the peak-load capacity according to the demand in summer. These adaptation processes 
should be totally autonomous given the publicly available information on regional climate change 
impacts. 
Thus, presumably most of the needed adaptation activities in the energy sector will be of autono-
mous nature, as anticipated also in the German Adaptation Strategy (Bundesregierung 2008). How-
ever, there are good reasons for a limited state intervention on grounds of security of supply, in 
funding of research and development and in the regulation of networks. Moreover, even neglecting 
mitigation effects, an increase of energy retail prices seems very likely due to adverse climate im-
pacts on production costs. This is likely to create new challenges for energy policy – ensuring ac-
cess to basic energy services to the poor. The phenomenon of “energy poverty” is by no means lim-
ited to the developing world. It has been a topic of an intensive public debate in the UK that has led 
to government programs providing fuel subsidies for poor and elderly people (BERR 2007) Other 
countries in the EU have started discussing the problem (EPEE 2008). As explained in section 2.4, 
an efficient answer to this challenge by public policy requires a definition of basic energy needs 
and a study of cost-efficient measures to achieve them. 
3.5 Impacts on water and coastal protection 
There are major challenges arising from climate change for water and coastal protection: (i) the 
water balance in summer, (ii) the increased risk of inland flood events, and (iii) sea level rise and 
storm surges. These different fields of action are related to different actors of the national economy. 
In Germany, the ground water balance affects mainly local state actors, like communities. Inland 
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floods challenge authorities on the federal state level as well as private actors, whereas coastal pro-
tection clearly is a public issue. 
Regarding water balance in summer, one has to notice the increasing risks of long drought periods 
as well as the general trend of less mean precipitation in summer months. The combination of both 
effects may eventually lead to local and temporary shortages in ground water supply and decreased 
river runoffs in summer. This, in turn, could give rise to water pollution, since low water levels 
tend to increase the concentration of solids or other harming substances and warm temperatures 
may cause algal blooms. Due to the cross-sectional characteristic of the water sector, many water-
dependent economic sectors would be negatively influenced by water shortages and quality con-
straints. Not only agriculture and energy, but also transport and tourism20 would suffer from limited 
clean water availability. In contrast, apart from locally and temporarily limited events, drinking 
water safety is not considered to be endangered in Germany (Leibundgut and Kern 2006, UBA 
2005). One reason is the fact that most of the drinking water supply is fed by groundwater sources 
and not by surface water (Bundesregierung 2008). Another reason is the strong decline in drinking 
water consumption in Eastern Germany after 1990, which results in significant capacities of drink-
ing water infrastructure lying idle in these parts of Germany which are also particularly vulnerable 
to water scarcity according to climate projections (Komar 1999, UBA 2005). 
The risk of inland floods has increased in the last decades above its natural variation margins 
(Bartels et al. 2005) and is expected to increase further. The reasons are an increased probability of 
stark rainfalls and a higher mean precipitation in winter which change the discharge regimes of 
rivers. However, other reasons for inland floods may loose relevance, as snow melting runoff might 
decrease as well as river floods due to ice floe (Eisenreich 2005, Bronstert 1996).  
Probably the most widely known impact of climate change is the sea level rise. Projections of the 
climate-induced sea level rise vary between 18 cm and 59 cm by 2100 (IPCC 2007a chapter 10, 
lower bound of scenario B1 and upper bound of scenario A1FI). There are, however, also modeling 
approaches which estimate a sea level rise of more than 1 m by 2100 (Rahmstorf 2007, upper 
bound of scenario A1FI). These considerable discrepancies demonstrate the scientific challenges in 
estimating future sea levels, since they depend on temperature, windiness21, thermal water expan-
sion, and the interactions of these and other hardly predictable variables. Difficulties in predicting 
                                                 
20 Touristic lakeland areas may lose attractiveness if the water quality is harmed by to little influx (Dietrich 2004).  
21 According to IPCC (2007a) chapter 5, wind alone can cause changes in steric (not global) sea level. 
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future windiness and resulting uncertainty about storm surges exacerbate the knowledge gaps on 
future threats from sea level rise (von Storch et al. 2007). Furthermore, in Germany geological 
downwards drifts of the coastal land of 1,5 mm – 2,5 mm per year add to the projected sea level 
rise (Sterr 2007). Due to these geological and physical complexities, all predictions of sea level rise 
are subject to severe uncertainty. Though exact predictions of socio-economic impacts thereby are 
difficult, Germany is classified as highly sensitive in respect to sea level rise (Tol et al. 2008), since 
the topography, the population density, and the sensitive ecosystem in coastal areas contribute to 
high risks of a sea level rise (Sterr 2007). On a global scale, Hamburg belongs to the top 20 cities 
most exposed to sea level rise in terms of exposed asset accumulation (Nicholls et al. 2007). The 
study estimates the population in the exposed area in Hamburg to be 261,000 people and exposed 
assets in the order of 40 bn USD. According to Nicholls et al. (2007), by the 2070’s the assets at 
risk can amount up to more than 120 bn USD, which will rank, however, not any more in the top 
20.  
3.6 Adaptation in water and coastal protection 
Many of the government responses to scarce water supply in summer can be reasoned by the ra-
tionale of a secure supply, particularly with regard to drinking water. For example, local govern-
ments may increase the monitoring of water quality, regulate more strictly the private withdrawal 
from public waters, and invest in additional water supply infrastructure.22 Beside the security of 
supply argument state intervention can be rationalized by the network character of water supply and 
thereby by the provision of an imperfect public good as mentioned in section 2.1. Moreover, as an 
example for a pure public good, governments are supporting the dissemination of information on 
efficient water use and irrigation. Autonomous adaptation mainly consists of the adjustment of wa-
ter consumption behavior to this information. Thus, autonomous adaptation plays a rather minor 
role here. 
Concerning inland floods, an important autonomous adaptation measure is the use of insurance. 
Since 1994, flood risks can be insured by private households and companies within an insurance 
against natural hazards (in Eastern Germany even before 1994, as respective regulations of the for-
mer government continued). However, the insurance of extreme flood events poses a serious chal-
                                                 
22 In Eastern Germany these investments are expected to be limited for reasons explained in the preceding section. 
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lenge for insurance companies; free markets often fail in providing an insurance protection for ex-
treme events. As described in section 2.3 one important reason for that market failure is that the 
basing law of large numbers does not apply for extremely rare and costly events. Another reason 
why demand for natural hazard coverage is relatively low is the high discounting and underestima-
tion of rare events (myopic behavior). Finally, the expectations of ad-hoc relief by the state hamper 
demand for insurance as in the case of crop yield insurance in agriculture. As a result, the reluc-
tance of contracting insurance can cause a break-down in existing insurance markets, since demand 
is too low to sufficiently outweigh adverse selection effects and consequently premiums are quite 
high. On that account a mandatory natural hazard insurance scheme as presented in section 2.3 has 
been suggested for Germany (Schwarze and Wagner 2003). By now this scheme could not be real-
ized mainly due to over-valued premiums and deductibles. So there is still a high probability of 
politically motivated ad-hoc emergency aid with the mentioned adverse effects on willingness to 
pay for autonomous adaptation measures.  
In the sense of an efficient solution presented in the theory part of this paper the state should in-
crease the awareness of risks in flood-prone areas and at the same time credibly make clear that ad-
hoc relief measures are just to ease the most extreme hardships. These measures in combination 
could facilitate a functioning insurance market which would result in efficient autonomous adapta-
tion and presumably lower insurance premiums. The approach of the Bavarian state government 
mentioned above (Bayerische Staatsregierung 2009) may serve as a first example of such a market 
oriented strategy, since it does not interfere into relative prices and is restricted to information and 
sensitisation of private households. In particular, the announcement of no state relief for insurable 
households is essential for functioning markets. However, it is questionable whether the govern-
ment can credibly announce to deny any emergency relief above mere subsistence (e.g. due to po-
litical economy rationales). Moreover, beside government intervention there are also possible ex-
pectations of considerable private donations which could have adverse effects on private adaptation 
decisions. These effects are hardly predictable and not avoidable. Taking this into account, further 
instruments with a higher degree of intervention such as mandatory insurance may be appropriate. 
Another government intervention mentioned in the German Adaptation Strategy is the adaptation of 
construction guidelines and regulations, such that new constructions in flood-endangered areas 
must be constructed in a flood-resistant manner (Bundesregierung 2008). To some extent a regula-
tion of private building is indispensable (examples are given in section 2.3). But considering that 
flood-resistant building on the household-level protects only home-owners and has no significant 
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impacts on the neighbors or the public, external effects are of minor importance. Thus, given suffi-
cient information and risk awareness there is no market failure in the construction sector with re-
gard to flood adaptation; and private agents would not need to be ordered to adapt.  
Regarding these autonomous adaptation activities related to floods, the crowding-out effect by col-
lective adaptation has also to be taken into account. In some cases public flood protection barriers 
may be effective, but private adaptation like flood-adapted building, insurance or retreat might 
cause lower costs. Then in the case of public investment in flood protection autonomous adaptation 
would be crowded out by collective adaptation and the economically second best solution would be 
the outcome (section 2.1).  
Coastal protection is another important field of government action. Coastal protection infrastruc-
tures such as dykes have always been the prime example for a local public good. Other adaptation 
measures in regard to coastal protection are soft protection measures like revitalization and protec-
tion of natural flooding barriers, monitoring of the tides, and adapted spatial planning. Applying the 
paradigm of public goods, one concludes these measures fall into government’s responsibility. In 
Germany the federal states are in charge of planning and financing coastal protection, whereas the 
federal government only assists in funding of initial investments. This is broadly in line with the 
theory of fiscal federalism mentioned in section 2.1 (Oates 1999) that places the financial and op-
erational responsibility for a local good at the local level. However, this assignment of decision-
making authority also leads to a need of coordination and cooperation between government entities 
like neighboring states, such as Bremen and Lower-Saxony. The two states have a common coast at 
the North Sea and therefore have drafted and implemented a common coastal protection strategy 
(PRC 2009). As described in section 2.1, if cooperation fails due to a conflict of interest between 
the two regions the central government has to step in to enforce a solution. 
It is also worth mentioning that it may become economically reasonable to abandon some parts of 
land when the sea level rises further – a point developed in theory in section 2.1. In that case the 
question arises whether the state should abandon parts of the land and reimburse land owners who 
have relied on the guarantee of their ownership, manifested in public spatial planning; or to remain 
an economically expensive but politically desirable protection of the land. In that context spatial 
planning and building permissions become a very cost sensitive field of collective adaptation to 
climate change. Decisions today may cause high fiscal costs after several decades.  
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3.7 Impacts on public health 
Apart from its undisputed, yet hard to measure importance for human well-being, the German 
health sector accounted for 7.0 % of GDP in 2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). Any normative 
economic analysis of public health poses tremendous challenges: Economic indicators alone like 
measurable costs and benefits or supply and demand can not reflect values associated with health in 
the society. We will get back to that issue later.  
Talking about public health, demographic change has to be taken into account. In Germany, a sig-
nificant ageing of the population is predicted by demographers. By 2050, the ratio of people older 
than 65 years will be between 30 % and 36 %, compared to 19 % in 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2006). This will also have effects on the impacts of climate change, since this group is considered 
to be particularly climate-sensitive (Hübler et al. 2008).  
Climate change impacts on human health can be divided into direct and indirect impacts. First, we 
will consider direct impacts like temperature-stress effects of cold days and heat days. Considering 
cold days, the warming climate is expected to contribute to a lower cold-related mortality. Heat 
days are expected to occur more often, especially in the South-West and in urban areas. Hübler et 
al. (2008) estimate a beneficial effect on the number of cold-casualties in the order of 3,000 lives, 
given the current demographic situation. Since elderly people also respond more sensitively to 
cold-stress, the positive effect can be up to 5,000 lives taking the expected demographic develop-
ment into account. In contrast, the mortality due to high temperatures is expected to rise as a conse-
quence of more frequent heat waves and hot days. Hübler et al. (2008) predict this adverse effect to 
be stronger than the beneficial effect (5,000 respectively 8,500 additional casualties, depending on 
accounting for the demographic factor). However, these results do not account for any adaptation to 
warmer temperature (e.g. housing, behavioral change), an assumption which is obviously not realis-
tic. Other studies suggest much more positive net effects. Keatinge et al. (2000) assume natural and 
technical adaptation and expect an outweighing of additional heat mortality by much larger declines 
in cold related mortalities without quantification. Bosello et al. (2006) predict for the EU a decline 
in temperature-related mortality of 176,000 by 2050. These discrepancies make clear that the con-
nection between climate and human health is far from being fully understood and additional re-
search is needed in this area.  
Second, a number of indirect health effects of climate change are promoted by a warmer climate. 
Examples in Germany are allergies (caused by invasive thermophile plants and longer vegetation 
periods), vectors (in particular ticks which are expected to spread due to warmer temperatures), 
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solar radiation,23 and possibly contaminations of drinking water (locally and temporarily limited, 
UBA 2005). However, there is still a lack of high quality epidemiological studies (e.g. concerning 
temperature effects on animal vectors), and the connection of climate and indirect health effects 
needs more research to be fully understood. 
Regarding the monetary effects of climate change in human health, ethical issues become relevant. 
Questions about the monetary valuation of human life or a healthy life can not be assessed by 
economists alone. There are attempts to evaluate the economic costs of adverse health effects by 
hospitalization costs and macroeconomic productivity losses (Hübler et al. 2008), but the actual 
monetary valuation of human lives is beyond the scope of economic theory. Unfortunately, as an 
evaluation of alternative investments in health systems often means outbalancing different human 
lives, additional value judgments are needed. Some principles health economists adhere to are 
equality and productivity: Every human life can be valued equally, or there may be an adjustment 
to the expected remaining life years or to the age-specific mean productivity. In any case, for politi-
cal decision-makers it is important to follow consistent and transparent rules and criteria for outbal-
ancing of alternative investments in different health systems.  
3.8 Adaptation in public health 
Regardless of the real net effect of future temperature-related mortality, there is no dispute that ad-
aptation is needed to limit or avoid adverse climate change effects on human health. Even if the 
avoided cold-related mortality were much higher than the additional heat-related mortality, casual-
ties always urge for action to counteract them (Keatinge et al. 2000). Moreover, studies for cities in 
the USA suggest a high potential of effective adaptation activities.24 
With regard to heat waves, the greatest part of adaptation responses is of autonomous nature. Given 
expectations of a warming climate, private households and firms may install air-conditioning or 
ventilation or plan new buildings in a manner that reduces indoor heat during summer. Housing is a 
private good and decisions are decentralized, the role of the government should be limited to con-
                                                 
23 Even if the solar radiation itself will not intensify due to climate change, individual behavior in warmer temperatures 
may be more promotive for skin cancer caused by solar radiation. 
24 Weisskopf et al. (2002) assess the health effects of two heat waves in Milwaukee, USA and come to the conclusion 
that differences in morbidity and mortality were not attributable to temperature differences alone, but also to improved 
health system preparedness and information policy. The effects of other impacts than temperature variation on mortal-
ity rates are estimated at a decrease by at least 49 %. Davis et al. (2003) observe a decline in heat-related mortality in 
different US cities and attribute this desensitization to a suite of technical, infrastructural, and biophysical adaptations. 
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trol and enforcement of contracts (which may specify air conditioning as part of a renting agree-
ment). At the most, government intervention is appropriate to provide for necessary information for 
renting agreements, as it is practiced already in Germany by the introduction of the compulsory 
energy performance certificate for buildings (EnEV 2007, Dena 2009). The existing regulation 
which focuses on the energy need for heating could easily be adapted in order to take into account 
the energy need for cooling. Focusing on the energy need for cooling has the advantage that several 
cooling techniques (air-conditioning, reducing building’s albedo, water-based cooling etc.) could be 
considered in order to reduce the costs of cooling. This regulation would comprehensively tackle 
the information asymmetries in renting agreements and thereby allow for well-informed, autono-
mous market-led decisions.25 In contrast, local policy makers may be confronted with decisions 
regarding the allocation of scarce resources for technical adaptation to heat waves in publicly 
owned facilities (e.g. kindergartens, schools, nursing homes and hospitals). They have to confront a 
difficult ethical cost-benefit analysis, counterbalancing different aspects of human well-being given 
scarce funds. Economics can help by providing a consistent and transparent framework for deci-
sion-making, not, though, by providing definite answers. Akbari et al. (2009) analyze a relatively 
simple, but effective measure that home-owners can undertake to reduce heat effects – the albedo-
effect of white-painted buildings and pavements. Furthermore, they found that sufficient white 
color in urban areas not only reduces high indoor temperatures but also contributes essentially to an 
abatement of urban warming. That is, it can be efficient to promote urban albedos since – in the 
case of private buildings – it is an autonomous adaptation measure with positive externalities. 
However, beside the technical feasibility of adaptation options (which is quite high for urban al-
bedos) decision makers also have to take account of social and cultural feasibility which may be-
come very relevant, e.g. in picturesque old towns. Other major state-run adaptation initiatives with 
regard to direct health effects are characterized by production and distribution of information (e.g. 
information on adverse health effects of heat), and the provision of monitoring and early-warning 
systems, which fall into the category provision of public goods.  
Also the adaptation policy to indirect health effects encompasses information and monitoring sys-
tems. The government may communicate threats of diseases promoted by warmer climate, such as 
the tickborne encephalitis, the lyme borreliosis, or solar radiation; and give advices for protection 
                                                 
25 Possible external effects of additional energy demand due to technical cooling responses (GHG-emissions of power 
production) are best off-set by a regulatory framework for emissions from electricity generation – for Germany that is 
the EU Emissions Trading System. The issue can therefore be discussed separately from adaptation. 
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measures on the individual level. Most of the measures themselves clearly have the character of 
autonomous adaptation, e.g. the protection from solar radiation and ticks by long-sleeved clothes 
and adapted leisure behavior. An example of possible collective adaptation may be the elimination 
of invasive plants with allergenic effects on humans – a measure with clear positive externalities. 
To date the government runs information campaigns to sensitise private gardeners and farmers and 
to instruct them how to combat the ragweed plant, for example (BMU 2009, Julius-Kühn-Institut 
2009). However, from an economic point of view a stronger government intervention will become 
appropriate if social costs due to allergies exceed the costs of a centrally planned intervention.26 
Other adaptation measures are the education and training of medical staff with regard to prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of diseases promoted by warmer climate and intensified vaccination pro-
grams (in particular against tickborne encephalitis). These activities do not accrue to the govern-
ment itself (unless vaccination is necessary to avoid epidemic plagues, which is – at least to date – 
not expected by climate change induced health effects), however they still affect the public sector 
through public health insurances.  
In conclusion, adaptation to direct health effects like technical or behavioral responses to heat 
waves is predominantly autonomous; government intervention regarding heat is mainly constituted 
by information dissemination and investment decisions for public institutions. With regard to indi-
rect health effects, there are also considerable public activities, given the public structure of great 
parts of the health system in Germany.  
4. Conclusions and outlook 
Since the prospects for an effective international agreement on climate policy with binding emis-
sion reduction targets are uncertain and climate change impacts are becoming increasingly visible 
today already, politicians and researchers attach more and more importance to the topic of adapta-
tion to climate change. The economic analysis of adaptation, however, is still in infancy with a few 
economic studies covering specific aspects of adaptation. A notable exception is the contribution of 
de Bruin et al. (2009a), which includes different adaptation levels into the integrated assessment 
model DICE, thereby making the trade-off between mitigation and adaptation visible. In theory, 
this method can provide decision makers with necessary information on costs and benefits of adap-
                                                 
26 Social costs estimates for ragweed-induced diseases can be found in Reinhardt et al. (2003) and Gren et al. (2007). 
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tation options, thus offering a sound economic and quantitative framework for adaptation policy. 
However, as Ackermann et al. (2009) point out, currently available integrated assessment models 
have important limitations. The authors refer to models analyzing climate damages with a focus on 
mitigation, but still their critique also applies to models including adaptation. Some of their impor-
tant points of critique are the questionable assumptions regarding the rate of time preference, the 
speculative attempts of monetary assessment of human lives and ecosystems, and the downplaying 
of scientific uncertainty about the extent of expected damages. According to Ackermann et al. 
(2009 p. 304) the models are “[p]redicting the unpredictable and pricing the priceless”. While this 
view is debatable, clearly, there is no doubt that the current models have restrictions limiting their 
predictive power for cost-benefit-analyses. A preliminary solution may be the multi-criteria analy-
sis (de Bruin et al. 2009b). The approach takes into account various adaptation options and judge-
ments of experts and stakeholders, and focuses not only on quantitative criteria, but due to data 
availability and estimation problems also includes qualitative criteria like Importance, Urgency, 
and No regret. Although this approach has its own limitations (of which some are raised by Füssel 
2009), it serves as a useful method to assess the possibilities of adaptation policy for the intermedi-
ate stage as long as data and knowledge gaps limit a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Still, 
more quantitative studies on adaptation efforts are needed, in particular on the costs and benefits of 
measures in specific sectors such as energy or health and on the direct and indirect economic ef-
fects of adaptation efforts on the economic system. 
This paper takes a more general view upon adaptation policy. It does not attempt to identify spe-
cific high-priority policy options, but rather analyses fields of action for policy makers and defines 
rationales and arguments for government intervention in adaptation processes. It aims at developing 
a broad economic framework for adaptation which can provide a foundation and starting point for 
future economic research. The perspective we take is the one of a sovereign state – not an interna-
tional arena, where regulation is difficult to enforce. The economic framework allows us to distin-
guish between autonomous adaptation by private agents on the one hand and collective adaptation 
measures by governmental entities on the other. Our theoretical economic approach to adaptation 
encompasses the theory of market failures, such as public goods or externalities, real option theory, 
the theory of insurance markets including moral hazard and adverse selection. The theoretical sec-
tion is completed by the consideration of more additional political objectives, namely equity and 
security of supply. Furthermore, any adaptation strategy has to supplement existing legislations. 
Hence, a normative and purely theoretical analysis is not sufficient but has to be accompanied by a 
positive analysis of current regulation. Nevertheless, cost-efficient solutions should always be the 
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starting point of a discussion before taking alternative strategies – adapted to the reality of a spe-
cific problem – into considerations in order to identify and possibly limit efficiency losses that may 
come along with the pursuit of politically motivated objectives. 
The efficiency-oriented approach developed in the theory part is then applied to the case of Ger-
many. Due to its size and geography as well as its relatively diversified sectoral structure Germany 
is a good example for the analysis and development of adaptation measures in climate sensitive 
sectors in industrialized countries, particularly in Europe. The case study about Germany covers the 
sectors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, namely agriculture, energy, water and 
coastal protection, and human health. Results indicate that in Germany a wide range of (positive 
and negative) impacts are to be expected which require differentiated adaptation strategies initiated 
at different levels of decision making. The case study is based on available literature about climate 
change and its economic impacts as well as adaptation measures implemented or planned in Ger-
many.  
In all sectors the provision and distribution of information about regional climate change impacts 
are central and necessary tasks of the government because public information is a classical public 
good whose provision creates considerable costs. The same holds true for the funding of basic re-
search and development of new technologies which facilitate the adaptation to climate change. As 
the agriculture sector has a long-time experience with adaptation to changing environmental and 
climate conditions it probably will not have difficulties to autonomously adapt to further incre-
mental climate change. In case of abrupt changes and extreme weather events, however, the avail-
ability and use of insurances becomes relevant and government intervention may be necessary if 
insurance markets do not lead to a reasonably efficient and politically acceptable outcome. Other 
government interventions are expected for the regulation of externalities caused by private adapta-
tion measures such as the use of pesticide and herbicide or genetically modified crops. Similarly in 
the energy sector most adaptation measures can be expected to take place autonomously. State in-
tervention therefore should be limited to the regulation of existing (environmental and network) 
externalities, the securing of energy supply and possibly energy poverty. In contrast to the agricul-
ture and energy sector, in the field of water and coastal protection considerable state intervention is 
indispensable. The responsibility of the government comprises the provision of local public goods 
such as dykes and recreation areas, the adjustment of existing construction guidelines and settle-
ment regulations, the consideration of vertical and horizontal equity aspects, and most important the 
establishment of a functioning insurance market. In the health sector both kind of adaptation, pri-
 
31 
 
vate and public, appear to be of importance. The installation of air-conditioning, the adjustment of 
building construction, and general behavior modification probably proceed autonomously. As op-
posed, the implementation of an early warning system, the regulation of immunizations, the educa-
tion and training of medical staff, and the technical adaptation of publicly owned facilities require 
far reaching state interventions as they all are characterized by the existence of market failures and 
respond to political prerogatives of equal access to medical treatment. 
The German National Adaptation Strategy which was published in December 2008 (BMU 2008) is 
rather vague and cautious regarding specific adaptation measures. It primarily focuses on the identi-
fication of vulnerable regions and sectors, the generation and distribution of information about re-
gional climate change impacts, the delineation of available adaptation options, the extension of ad-
aptation capacities, and the initiation of a public debate. Basically the same applies to the White 
Paper of the European Commission on adaptation which was published in April 2009 (COM 
2009b). This cautious approach reflects the current lack of knowledge and missing consensus on a 
strategy how to respond to the great challenge of climate change. As time proceeds, however, the 
need for action becomes more pressing – and arguably moderate overinvestment or underinvest-
ment in adaptation measures is preferable to inaction (Agrawala et al. 2009). As both official 
documents show, a coherent economic perspective on the topic is still missing. With this discussion 
paper, we hope to contribute to its development. 
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